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THE ALLOCATION OF CONTROL IN THE 
ORGANIZATION OF A CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATION UNDER THE NEW 
BRUNSWICK COMPANIES ACT
Richard C. Birdf
“The various types of business units — sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, business trusts, corporations — all are distinctive 
modes of organizing business enterprise. They are modes of 
allocating three elements of enterprise: (1) the risk of loss, (2) 
the power of control, and (3) the participation in the proceeds 
of the business activity. In corporate enterprises it is the cor­
porate ‘capital structure’ through which this allocation of risk, 
control, and profit is effected.”1 For instance, in a “one-man 
company” the shareholder who beneficially owns all of the cap­
ital stock, bears all the risk, has complete control, and is entitled 
to all the profits of the enterprise. But not all individuals in­
volved in business activity can undertake or want all the risk, 
complete control, and all the profits. Some may want to share 
the risk with their business associates who in turn will want 
compensation for their risks in the form of some control, or 
some profits or some of both. Some may want to bear the risk 
and share or transfer control and profits either for estate tax 
or other reasons. It should be obvious that the three elements 
of enterprise: risk, control, and profits may be allocated all to 
one individual, each allocated to separate individuals, or each 
element may be shared in an infinite number of proportions for 
a variety of reasons.
This range is possible because the corporate capital struc­
ture is, from a practical point of view, a matter of contract and 
thus confers a substantial degree of freedom on the draftsman 
of this structure. He may use debt or equity securities and if 
he uses the latter they may be classed as preferred, common, or 
deferred or may in fact be a hybrid of any combination of them 
in order to achieve the allocation desired. In Beament Estate v. 
M.N.R.,2 for example, a private investment holding company 
was incorporated where the deceased owned 2000 Class B shares 
and his two children each owned 12 Class A shares. The de­
ceased and the children each paid the par value for their shares, 
in each case $1 per share. The Class A shares were entitled to 
a 5% cumulative preferential dividend (it should be noted this 
dividend totalled $1.20 per year) and the holders of the Class B 
shares to the remaining net earnings of the company arising
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1 Herwitz, Business Planning (1966) 44.
2 70 D.T.C. 6i:>0 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
from income but not from capital gains. On dissolution or 
winding-up of the company the holders of the Class B shares 
were limited to receiving the par value of their shares and 
no more and the holders of the Class A shares were entitled 
to receive all the remaining distributable assets. Each Class A 
and each Class B share carried one vote. In summary the 
draftsman allocated to the deceased the risk (he contributed 
all the capital except for $24) and control (he owned 2000 of 
the 2024 voting shares), and to the children all capital gains 
and all profits on winding up.3 A more common allocation 
occurs where a financial institution loans risk capital, looking in 
return for a fixed return (interest) on its investment, leaving 
the shareholders to manage and control the corporation.
Previously it has been mentioned that each element may 
be shared in an infinite number of proportions. Risk of loss 
can be varied by use of debt, preferred, common, and deferred 
stock; profits can be allocated by the use of interest rates and 
the drafting of dividend provisions attaching to each class of 
stock. Control is not as easily shared. Where a corporations 
capital structure consists of only unclassified common stock, a 
shareholder owning fifty-one percent of the shares bears fifty- 
one percent of the risk of loss, is entitled to fifty-one percent 
of the profit, but has virtually one hundred percent control of 
the corporation. Subject to a few statutory restrictions,4 he is 
the directing mind and will of the corporation having complete 
control of at least the majority, if not all, of the directors of the 
corporation. This anomaly, if it can be properly called such, is 
a result of the principle of majority rule. The person or group 
of persons that can muster fifty-one percent or the votes at a 
shareholders meeting will, without more, be in full control. He 
has the power to control the corporate policy which will deter­
mine the success or failure of the business.
This element of control may also affect the element of 
participation in the proceeds of the business activity. Earnings 
may be paid out in the form of dividends, but normally they
3 For similar estate planning schemes see B arber Estate v. 
M.N.R., 66 D.T.C. 315 (T.A.B.) and Fiddes Estate v. M.N.R., 
70 D.T.C. 1117 (T .A.B.).
4 There are limitations on the power of control of a share­
holder who owns only 51 percent of the shares. Some m at­
ters under the New Brunswick Companies Act, R.S.N.B. 
1952, c .33, require approval of two-thirds, and sometimes 
three-fourths, of the votes of the shareholders, e.g., s. 30A 
(amalgamations), s. 38 (change of head office), s. 42 (sup­
plementary letters patent), s. 47 (compromises and arrange­
ments). s. 64 (changes in capital structure), s. 80 (borrow­
ing), s. 86 (change in number of directors), s. 87 (appoint­
ment of an executive committee). Under s. 91, minority  
shareholders in certain circumstances may elect directors.
5 See New Brunswick Companies Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 33, 
s. 95(l)(b).
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need not be.5 They may be retained to finance future expan­
sion or they may be paid out to select officers and employees 
(who are often the majority shareholders) in the form of in­
creased salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits and sometimes exces­
sive travel and entertainment expenses.6 Thus, from the posi­
tion of a minority shareholder, the allocation of control by a 
division of unclassified stock may be unsuitable. While fair­
ness may demand that one who provides fifty-one percent of 
the capital and bears that proportion of the risk of loss should 
also receive fifty-one percent of the profits, it does not follow 
that a majority shareholder should have virtually absolute con­
trol of the corporation.
There are several reasons why a minority shareholder may 
rightly want to restrict the power of control of the majority. 
Minority shareholders of closely held or close corporations are 
of two types: (i) those who view their ownership in the cor­
poration merely as an investment, and (ii) those who view their 
ownership in the corporation as an integral part of their partici­
pation in the management of the corporation and look to the 
corporation for their chief source of income. Where it is con­
sidered an investment, a minority shareholder probably antici­
pates two things: (i) dividends and (ii) capital gains. However, 
generally the board of directors need never declare a dividend. 
The majority, who will in most cases be managing the corpora­
tion, may find it more profitable to declare bonuses to them­
selves rather than pay dividends. This way they receive 100 
percent of the earnings rather than their mere majority interest. 
Potential dividends may never be forthcoming. Nor will capi­
tal gains be in the offing. Capital gains presuppose a sale of 
the investment at a profit which in turn necessitates the finding 
of a buyer. The market for shares representing a minority in­
terest in a close corporation is negligible, if not non-existent. 
Few people want to buy shares in a close corporation if there 
is little prospect of dividends ever being paid. The corporate 
advantage of free transferability of interests in these circum­
stances is often a myth, as may be capital gains.
For the minority shareholder who must look to the corpor­
ation for his chief source of income, the problem is more acute. 
Control of the corporation by the majority could mean the loss 
of employment and income in the future if he is subject to the 
whims of the majority which, as a general rule, he is. There is 
also the problem of financial support for his family should he 
die. Without a salary, a favourable dividend policy, or a ready 
market for the shares, his family may experience financial dif­
ficulties.
C See Elson, Shareholders A greem ents, A Shield for Mitiority 
Shareholders of Close Corporations (1967), 22 Bus. Law  449, 
at p. 450, for a list of hazards that face minority sharehold­
ers in a close corporation.
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One solution might be to advise our friend, the minority 
shareholder, not to place himself in this precarious position. 
We might insist on a partnership rather than a close corpora­
tion. The voice of a dissenting partner may be stronger (de­
pending on the terms of the partnership agreement) than that 
of a minority shareholder or even director. A partner has a 
right to withdraw his proportionate share of the profits each 
year. He need not wait for a declaration by an obstinate major­
ity. In addition, if he does not like their managerial policies or 
merely wants to retire, he may force a dissolution of the part­
nership and obtain the return of his investment. But a part­
nership too has its disadvantages. Potential unlimited liability 
is always a concern. Withdrawal of all the earnings of the 
business may seriously affect the financing of possible future 
expansion. There are often unfavourable tax consequences in 
using the profits of a partnership to finance expansion when 
compared with the corporation. And, of course, the potential 
threat of a forced dissolution, which could result in a liquida­
tion of the business, is often seen as out of proportion with the 
risk taken by a minority investor.
The task is apparent. What is needed is a hybrid form of 
business organization with taylored features of both corpora­
tion and partnership law: one that will adequately protect the 
interests of both the majority and the minority; one that might 
rightly be called an “incorporated partnership ”. It is submitted 
that the “closely held” or “close” corporation may legally be 
organized to fufill that need. A close corporation will have the 
characteristics of any other corporation. However, it is neces­
sary to restrict the power of the majority to determine execu­
tive compensation and dividend policies in order that the just 
expectations of the minority shareholder will be met. One may 
also want to “create a market” for his shares at a fair price on 
the happening of certain specified contingencies, e.g. death or 
retirement.
The Close Corporation
(a) Agreements Restricting the Powers of the Board of 
Directors
Since executive compensation and dividend policies are 
prima facie determined by the Board of Directors, one might 
consider an agreement among all the directors binding them­
selves and thier successors to pursue policies set out in the 
agreement. Such an agreement might specify that existing 
salaries, etc., are not subject to change without the approval of 
all the parties to the agreement and that a specified portion of 
profits are to be paid out in the form of cash dividends. How­
ever, the usefulness of such an agreement depends on its valid- 
itv.
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The board of directors is responsible for the management of 
the corporation.7 With few exceptions, once elected, the direc­
tors are even beyond the control of the majority of shareholders.8 
Because directors act in a fiduciary capacity and must exercise 
their discretionary powers and judgment in good faith,9 general­
ly, any agreement restricting this managerial power is void, be­
ing against public policy and express statutory provisions.10
(b) Shareholders’ Agreements
On the other hand, an agreement among shareholders con­
tractually binding them to vote their stock in a specified man­
ner on corporate issues is valid.11 Generally, a shareholder may 
vote his stock in his own interest, owing no fiduciary duty to 
his fellow shareholders when voting on corporate issues.12 
Thus, for example, ensuring the election of the parties to the 
agreement to the board of directors is a valid contractual ob­
ject.13 Of course, in many instances, this result could be a- 
chieved by enacting cumulative voting-by-laws.
In Ringuet v. Bergeron14 a provision in a shareholders’ 
agreement ensuring the election of certain individuals as offi­
cers at stated and agreed salaries was upheld. The provision 
was not construed as tying the hands of the directors and com­
pelling them to exercise the power of management in a particu­
lar way.
It [was] no more than an agreement among sharehold­
ers owning or proposing to own the m ajority of the 
issued shares of a company to unite upon a course of 
policy or action and upon the officers whom they will 
elect. There is nothing illegal or contrary to public or­
ders in an agreement for achieving these purposes.
7 New Brunswick Companies Act, ss. 86(1), 95(1).
8 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cun- 
ingham e, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.) (directors refusal to carry  
out a resolution, passed by a m ajority of votes of the share­
holders, requesting the sale of the undertaking); Denault v. 
Stew ard, Denault & Co. (1918), 54 Que. S.C. 209 (C.A.). 
(dividend declared by the board of directors could not be 
set aside by the shareholders in the absence of special pro­
visions in the letters patent).
9 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., [1925] 1 Ch. 407 
(C.A.).
10 See M otherwell v. Schoof, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 812 (Alta. Sup. 
C t.); Rinquet v. B ergeron, [1960] S.C.R. 672.
11 M otherwell v. Schoof, [1949]) 4 D.L.R. 812, (Alta. Sup. Ct.); 
Rinquet v. B ergeron, [1960] S.C.R. 672.
12 See Northwest Transportation Co. v. Beatty  (1887), 12 App. 
Cas. 589 (P.C.),
13 M otherwell v. Schoof, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 812 (Alta. Sup. Ct.); 
Rinquet v. B ergeron, [I960] S.C.R. 672.
14 [1960] S.C.R. 672.
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Shareholders have the right to combine their interests 
and voting powers to secure such control of a company 
and to ensure that, the company will be managed by 
certain persons in a certain m a n n e r . '5
Generally, the appointment and remuneration of officers is 
a power conferred on the board of directors.16 Here, there was 
at least a slight impingement on this power which appeared to 
be immaterial to the Supreme Court of Canada. It is submitted 
that, following Rinquet v. Bergeron, shareholders may effective­
ly determine executive compensation policies by agreement. 
A fortiori, increased salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits, and exces­
sive travel and entertainment expenses may be prohibited by 
agreement among shareholders. This of course is not far from 
existing statutory directives which require confirmation of exec­
utive compensation policies by a majority of shareholders.17
It is submitted that a provision regulating dividend policy 
is also valid. As long as the rights of creditors are adequately 
protected, it does not appear that such provisions are contrary 
to any public policy. In the case of memorandum of association 
companies, “the terms on which [dividends] are payable, and 
the method of declaring them, depend entirely on the provi­
sions in the articles.”18 Likewise, provisions in the letters pat­
ent should also prevail. In addition, “probably no court would 
deny the validity of an agreement which curtails directorial dis­
cretion by forbidding the declaration of dividends under speci­
fied circumstances. A decision to the contrary would seriously 
affect billions of dollars of bond indentures already in existence 
which rely on just that limitation.”19 The converse is probably 
also true. If this is so, shareholders may effectively predeter­
mine dividend policies.
The type of agreement contemplated was upheld by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois in Galler v. Galler in 1964.20 The 
agreement recited as its purpose the provision of income for the 
support and maintenance of the families of two brothers who 
were the main shareholders. The essential features of the agree­
ment were as follows:21
15 Ibid., at p. 684.
16 New Brunswick Companies Act, s. 96 (l)(d ); see also Quebec 
Companies Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 271, s. 88(2)(d); Note (1961), 
39 Can. B ar Rev. 469.
17 New Brunswick Companies Act, s. 95(2).
18 Gower, M odern Company Law, (3rd ed., 1969), at p. 353.
19 Hornstein, Stockholders’ A greem ents in the Closely Held  
Corporation (1950), 59 Yale L. J . 1040, at p. 1045. See also 
Fraser, Canadian Company Form s, (3rd ed., 1947), at p. 733; 
MacKelcan, Canadian Bond Issues (1952), 30 Can. B ar Rev. 
325, at p. 332.
20 (1964), 203 N.E. 2d 577.
21 Ibid., at pp. 580-1; see also Elson, supra., note 6, at pp. 454-5.
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1. The by-laws of the corporation would be amended to 
provide for a board of four directors; a quorum would be three.
2. The shareholders would cast their votes for the two 
brothers and their wives as directors.
3. In the event of death of either brother, his wife would 
have the right to nominate a director in place of the decedent.
4. After the death of either brother, annual dividends of 
$50,000 would be declared if retained earnings exceeded $500,- 
000, along with additional optional features.
5. During the lifetime of the brothers, the then officers of 
the corporation would continue to be elected by the directors.
6. The corporation would enter into a salary continuation 
contract with respect to both brothers, under which the cor­
poration would be authorized to pay the widow of each de­
ceased brother or his children certain monthly payments.
It is submitted that, following Rinquet v. Bergeron,22 a 
similar agreement would be legal in Canada. In the words of 
Underwood J., “There is no reason why mature men should not 
be able to adapt the statutory form to the structure they want, 
so long as they do not endanger other stockholders, creditors, 
or the public or violate a clear mandatory provision of the cor­
poration law.”23
There may be an advantage in expressly providing for 
shareholder control of executive compensation and dividend 
policies in the letters patent.24 Letters patent is a grant from 
the state. As such, the powers conferred on the shareholders in 
the charter cannot be attacked without making the Attorney- 
General a party, and when it is shown that the provisions are 
contrary to law.25 The powers of the board of directors (includ­
ing executive compensation and dividend policies) set out in 
section 95 of the New Brunswick Companies Act are subject to 
the letters patent. Thus, it is submitted, that such provisions 
are not contrary to law.26 Further, courts are less apt to in­
validate executive grants than a shareholders’ agreement.
22 [1960] S.C.R. 672.
23 Galler v. Galler (1964), 203 N.E. 2d 577 (111. Sup. Ct.).
24 See Notice of Supplementary Letters Patent. Eastview In­
vestments Ltd., The Royal Gazette, Jan u ary 2, 1969, Vol. 127, 
p. 10, where it is stated: “a limitation has been provided 
respecting the amount of salary or other payments which 
may be paid to any director or officer of the company or to 
any employee who is a shareholder . . .”
25 Galbraith  v. Madawaska Club  (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 424, at 
p. 437 (Ont. High Ct.).
26 Contra, Fraser & Stewart, Company Law of Canada (5th ed., 
1962), at pp. 529-30.
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Opposing this view, one might argue that, if a power con­
ferred on a board of directors must be exercised in a fiduciary 
capacity, likewise shareholders must exercise the same power 
in a fiduciary capacity. However, one writer27 contends “that 
this doctrine does not apply in the case where the wishes of all 
the shareholders of a company are known to the directors. In 
such a case the directors should give primary consideration to 
the fulfillment of those wishes even if they are different from 
what the directors conceive to be in the best interests of the 
company. As a necessary corollary, agreements made by direc­
tors binding the future use of their discretions are valid where 
all the shareholders of the company are parties to the agree­
ment or otherwise consent thereto.” Note, however, if reliance 
is to be placed on this contention, all the shareholders must be 
a party to the agreement.
In sum, it is submitted that Canadian Courts have closely 
followed their United States counterparts. . . [Tlhere has 
been a definite albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judi­
cial treatment of the close corporation as sui generis. Several 
shareholder-director agreements that have technically ‘violated’ 
the letter of the Business Corporation Act have nevertheless beer: 
upheld in the light of the existing practical circumstances, i.e., 
no apparent public injury, the absence of a complaining minor­
ity interest, and no apparent prejudice to creditors . . . [Clourts 
have long ago quite realistically . . . .  relaxed their attitudes 
concerning statutory compliance when dealing with close cor­
porate behaviour, permitting ‘slight deviations’ from corporate 
‘norms’ in order to give legal efficacy to common business prac­
tice.”28
(c) Sale of Shares of a Close Corporation
Rather than provide for the payment of dividends or a 
salary continuation agreement following the death or retire­
ment of a shareholder, a minority shareholder may prefer to sell 
his interest in the business. W e have already seen that the 
market for minority interests in a close corporation is limited, 
there being few buyers. Sometimes the market is even further 
restricted by special provisions in the letters patent relating to 
the transfer of shares or by the enactment of special close cor­
poration by-laws.
Section 77 of the New Brunswick Act specifically provides 
for the creation of a close corporation and consequent restric­
tions on transfer by bylaw. However, the provision is severely
27 Howard, Note (1959), 37 Can. B ar Rev. 490, at p. 492.
28 Galler v. Galler (1964), 203 N.E. 2d 577, at p. 584 (111. Sup. 
Ct.). Compare M otherwell v. Schoof, [19491 4 D.L.R. 812 
(Alta. Sup. Ct.) and Rinquet v. B ergeron, [1960] S.C.R. 672.
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limited in application. All section 77 authorizes is the creation 
of a close corporation in which the shares are not transferable 
to a person who is not already a shareholder without the consent 
of the board of directors. No provision for the purchase of those 
shares may be imposed under this section.29 Section 77 was in­
tended to give the directors of a close corporation an opportun­
ity to select their associates as in the case of a partnership. It 
was not intended in any way to afford protection for minority 
shareholders.
More elaborate restrictions, and in some instances, pro­
visions more beneficial to the minority shareholder, may be in­
serted in the letters patent in New Brunswick. Section 37 of 
the New Brunswick Companies Act recognizes the validity of 
restrictions on the transfer of shares in the letters patent, e.g. 
options to purchase and rights of first refusal.30
More beneficial, however, is a shareholders buy-sell agree­
ment.31 A buy-sell agreement binds a shareholder to sell and 
others to buy his shares at a determinable price in the event of 
specified happenings, e.g. death or retirement. Thus a buyer 
for the minority shareholders interest is guaranteed.
Conclusion
It is submitted that a well-drawn shareholders' agreement 
entered into by all the shareholders contemporaneously with 
the formation of a corporation should be an effective means of 
protecting the minority shareholder.32 The focal points in such 
an agreement are the appointment and remuneration of officers 
and directors, the determination of divided policy, and the pro­
vision for the sale of shares. While it is submitted that there 
is authority in Canada for the above conclusion, it must be re­
membered that the validity of the answers suggested to the 
problem is not certain. Until further judical development or 
legislation reform, one must proceed cautiously.
29 Em erson  v. Provincial Secretary-T reasurer, [ 1941 ] 2 D.L.R.
232 (N.B.C.A.).
30 E.g., Notice of Letters Patent, W. E. Hale Associates Limited, 
The Royal Gazette, Ju ly  3, 1968, Vol. 126, p. 364.
31 The buy-sell agreem ent is extensively dealt with by Huber - 
man, Buy and Sell A greem ents for Canadian Close Corpor­
ations (1963), 41 Can. B ar Rev. 538.
32 See also Elson, supra., note 6, at p. 457.
